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SUMMARY 
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INTRODUCTION 
Contracts are one of the most popular forms for 
coordinating supply chains. As a hard tool, contracts give 
a framework for the cooperation, determining the 
conditions of risk and benefits-sharing in the case of 
uncertainty in either the supply or the demand (Coltman et 
al. 2009). Therefore, the contract minimizes the number of 
the possible conflicts, bringing balance in the chain, and 
this can decrease the level of different dominances.  
Nowadays a number of researchers deal with contracts 
– for example they analyse the coordination power of the 
different types, creating numerical examples to determine 
the advantages and disadvantages of use. There are 
different types of traditional contracts and some authors try 
to mix these contracts to create some hybrid or extremely 
complex types, because these solutions can be relevant to 
the coordination issue (Katok & Pavlov 2013; Zhang et al. 
2013; Molnár 2017).  
This paper introduces one non-traditional composite 
contract and one traditional; the take-it-or-leave-it contract 
and the quantity discount contract. Take-it-or-leave-it 
contracts use the advantages of a centralized setting, which 
is the preferred setting for supply chains. Both types can 
be used in decentralized supply chains. The aim of this 
paper is to determine which type is better in terms of 
supply chain coordination.  
POSSIBLE SETTINGS  
OF THE SUPPLY CHAIN 
There is a significant question in terms of coordination 
– the setting. It is important what kind of setting is used by 
the chain. Two possible settings are identified; a 
decentralized setting is preferred by companies, because 
they can act in their own interest, but according to the 
studies of many researchers, a centralized setting can be 
better (e.g. Chakraborty et al. 2015).  
Decentralized Setting of the Supply Chain 
This is the classical approach. The level of cooperation 
between the partners is minimal, they do not share all 
information – for example about the demand – with each 
other, and the chain members are interested in maximizing 
their own profit. The decentralized setting exists because 
the companies deal with their short-term goals. But this 
approach is not profitable for the supply chain members in 
the long term.  
The members can maximize their profit, but only in the 
short term. This process is at the expense of the others’ 
performance. These companies will decrease the quantity 
of the orders, therefore the profits of all members will also 
decline. Consequently, the total profit will decrease.  
We can realize the biggest problem of the decentralized 
setting if we analyse the behaviour of two side-by-side 
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chain members. The goal of the customer is to purchase 
the largest quantity at the lowest available price. But the 
second member would like to sell its products at the 
highest price possible, because of profit maximization. 
Thus, the chain members have conflicts of interest. In the 
beginning, member one can maximize its profit, but later, 
because of the higher prices, member two is going to 
reduce the needed quantity from order to order, and in the 
worst case it will search for another partner. Neither of the 
members can maximize the profit, thus the total profit of 
the whole chain will not be satisfactory. This phenomenon 
leads to double marginalization (Li et al. 2013). This is the 
major disadvantage of the decentralized setting.  
The Vertical Integration of Supply Chain 
Coordination mechanisms try to eliminate the negative 
effects of double marginalization. For this, it is necessary 
to enhance the cooperation and the level of information-
sharing (Giannocaro 2018). The first and the most 
important step for the chain members is to strive for long-
term cooperation instead of short-term profit 
maximization. It helps to increase the level of vertical 
integration, which means the totally cooperation between 
the members. Actually, the vertical integration of supply 
chain means the centralized setting.  
This kind of centralized setting is difficult to 
implement, but it leads to more efficient operation than the 
decentralized setting. The members prioritize the goals of 
the whole supply chain and they operate in a way that will 
reach these goals. The level of information-sharing and 
cooperation is higher than in the decentralized setting.  
Usually, this setting has a leader – called the ‘supply 
chain leader’ – who is a relatively dominant member in the 
chain. The leader makes the strategic decisions to 
maximize the total profit and increase the efficiency of the 
supply chain (Pibernik & Sucky 2006). Because of this 
leader, this setting is called centralized.  
The operation of the centralized setting assumes long-
term planning. The chain members do not focus on 
maximizing their own profit in a short-term period, 
because they can realize a higher profit in the long term.  
The prices in the case of the centralized setting are 
lower, which stimulates the quantity sold. The higher the 
quantity sold, the higher the realizable profit. So this 
means that the total profit of the chain can be also higher. 
In the case of a decentralized setting, members want to 
maximize just their own profit, meaning higher prices. As 
a result the quantity sold is lower and this undermines the 
overall profitability – and of course the performance – of 
the decentralized supply chain (Simchi-Levi et al. 2003).  
According to the literature, centralized supply chains 
are preferred, because with vertical integration the 
cooperation of chain members can be improved, which is 
one of the major prerequisites for supply chain 
coordination.  
CONTRACTS 
Contracts are a rewarding area for researchers because 
they are a method to help in the coordination of supply 
chains. To make coordination better and more successful 
we can use soft tools and hard tools (Szegedi 2017). 
Coordination with the help of the different types of 
contracts belongs to the group of hard tools, which controls 
the transactions, the production volumes and manages the 
financial actions for the economic operation.  
Contracts try to form relative equality between chain 
members because a framework is provided for the 
cooperation. It is determined how partners are to share 
risks and benefits (Coltman et al. 2009). According to the 
research of Wang et al. (2013), contracts are used to 
enhance the performance of the whole supply chain.  
Cachon (2003) determines the requirements that have 
to be fulfilled by contracts to be successful in the long 
term. First is feasibility: the conditions must be reasonable, 
otherwise contracts will put all of the partners at a 
disadvantage. Contracts need to be flexible to adapt to the 
dynamically changing environment and also to the needs 
of the parties signing the agreement. A contract can be 
successful if it satisfies the needs of both parties, especially 
in terms of making profit. There will be maximum 
satisfaction when this process is fair. Thus, the most 
important task of the contract is to reduce the inequity 
caused by a difference in the dominance level of the chain 
members. With this the profit can be divided more equally 
and fairly between the members. 
There are many types of contracts to help coordination. 
Traditional types are relatively simple, while a composite 
contract has more complicated conditions. The hybrid ones 
use at least two contracts to mix their parameters (Arani et 
al. 2016).  
Here one example of each type of contract will be 
presented. The paper also includes a numerical example to 
analyse the coordination level of concrete contracts.  
Take-it-or-Leave-it Contracts 
The name derives from the essence of the contract: first 
step, supplier offers the price, second step, customer 
accepts or refuses this offer. If the price is accepted, the 
customer can take the ordered items for the same price 
during the pre-agreed interval. If the price is not accepted, 
the customer leaves the items and the agreement is not 
concluded (Polo & Scarpa 2013). This could be risky for 
the customer, because a new offer from a different partner 
may include a higher price.  
Because of the fixed prices and the fixed payment, the 
supplier is protected against non-payment. The customer 
will receive the ordered quantity, because in the case of the 
take-it-or-leave-it contract, there is a delivery threshold, 
which is determined by the customer. This assumes that 
the customer will define a high enough threshold to satisfy 
its needs in any case. The customer orders this quantity and 
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pays for it, but there is no need to deliver the entire 
shipment at the same time. The conditions allow the 
customer to control the quantity of each delivery in the pre-
agreed period. This means that the customer can increase 
or decrease the actual quantity of certain orders up to the 
threshold. Therefore, the customer is also protected against 
non-delivery (Polo & Scarpa 2013).  
Quantity Discount Contracts 
This is probably one of the most popular contract types. 
The contract can be used in both centralized and 
decentralized settings. The unit price depends on the 
ordered quantity. This means that if the retailer increases 
the quantity ordered, the supplier can give a lower unit 
price. Thus the retailer is motivated to buy higher 
quantities. If the demand is uncertain, the customer can 
overstock, while the supplier may run out of stock. This is 
definitely a disadvantage of the quantity discount.  
To avoid this problem, some research tries to find an 
optimal quantity of order. If the quantity sold is the same 
as in the centralized setting, the best performance is 
available. Any other option of the discount results in worse 
rates (Molnár & Faludi 2019). So the quantity discount can 
coordinate the supply chain, if members use the optimal 
quantity.  
COMPARISON WITH NUMERICAL 
EXAMPLE 
I would like to present the coordination power of the 
contracts analysed before. To measure the efficiency, I 
compare the total profits, the individual profits, the unit 
prices and the market prices. The symbols of analysed 
rates, the notations and the available economic parameters 
are shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 
Notations and economic parameters 
Constant (1) v 115 
Constant (2) w 1.8 
Market price PMD 115 – 1.8*OQ 
Revenue-sharing rate of Member #1 (Supplier) M1α 0.6 
Revenue-sharing rate of Member #2 (Retailer) M2α 0.4 
Cost of Member #1 (Supplier) M1C 28 EUR 
Cost of Member #2 (Retailer) M2C 13 EUR 
Total cost of the members ∑MC 41 EUR 
Unit price UP depends on the contract type 
Ordered quantity OQ depends on the contract type 
Individual profit (Member #1 - Supplier) M1Π depends on the contract type 
Individual profit (Member #2 - Retailer) M2Π depends on the contract type 
Total profit ∑MΠ depends on the contract type 
Source: own construction 
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Source: own construction 
Figure 1. The structure of model 
The market price (PMD) is determined by the simplified 
market demand function. This function includes the 
retailer’s ordered quantity (it is the real market demand), 
and v and w, the market constants. The model assumes that 
all members are aware of this information and all of the 
chain members know that the other members are aware of 
this knowledge.  
Some calculations are the same in the case of every 
contract type. However, the unit price, the individual 
profits and the total profit have different calculations, and 
these depend on the contract type. The revenue-sharing 
rate must be determined because it is needed to calculate 
some rates of the quantity discount contract. A simple 
supply chain with two members is used here (Figure 1). 
The take-it-or-leave-it contract type mixes the 
characteristics of the centralized and decentralized 
settings. The calculation of the ordered quantity belongs to 
the centralized setting, so with this quantity the total profit 
can be maximized. But the unit price maximizes the 
individual profit for the supplier, which is typical of 
decentralized supply chains.  
The reason for this is found in its extreme nature. The 
ordered quantity is determined with the help of the total 
profit function of centralized setting. The total profit of the 
supply chain (Equation (1)) is maximized on the basis of 
the market demand, which will be the partial derivative of 
the quantity. If the equation is equal to zero, the ordered 
quantity can be expressed (Equation (2)).  
∑Π = (𝑣𝑣 − 𝑤𝑤 ∙ 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 − ∑𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀) ∙ 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 (1) 
𝜕𝜕∑Π
𝜕𝜕𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂
= 0 →  𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = 𝑣𝑣 −  ∑𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀2 ∙ 𝑤𝑤  (2) 
To determine the unit price, it is needed to use the profit 
function of the supplier (Equations (3)-(4)). Because the 
profit maximization is on the basis of the unit price, using 
the decentralized setting calculation for the ordered 
quantity is necessary (Equation (3)). 
The supplier’s profit depends on his cost and the unit 
price that he gets from the retailer, each of which is 
influenced by the ordered quantity. In the case of the 
retailer, calculations start with the market price paid by the 
customer, this is the income. This value will be decreased 
by the unit price paid to the supplier, and the retailer’s own 
costs – of course the ordered quantity will influence the 
profit. The calculations are given in Equations (3) and (5). 
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𝑀𝑀1Π = (𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 −  𝑀𝑀1𝑀𝑀) ∙ 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = (𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 −  𝑀𝑀1𝑀𝑀) ∙ 𝑣𝑣 − 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 −𝑀𝑀2𝑀𝑀2 ∙ 𝑤𝑤  (3) 
𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀1Π
𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈
= 0 → 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = 𝑣𝑣 −  𝑀𝑀2𝑀𝑀 +  𝑀𝑀1𝑀𝑀2  (4) 
  
𝑀𝑀2Π = (𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 −  𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 −  𝑀𝑀2𝑀𝑀) ∙ 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 (5) 
  
𝑀𝑀1Π = (1 −𝑀𝑀2𝛼𝛼) ∙ (𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ∙ 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂)𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 + 𝑀𝑀2𝛼𝛼 ∙ ∑𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀. (6) 
  
𝑀𝑀2Π = (𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ∙ 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂) − (𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 ∙ 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂) (7) 
While the take-it-or-leave-it type allows the customer 
or retailer to refuse the contract, the quantity discount type 
does not allow this. But a quantity discount offers more 
flexible conditions than the take-it-or-leave-it contract. 
According to the literature, the quantity discount 
performs at its best if the ordered quantity is the same as in 
the centralized supply chain (Molnár & Faludi 2019). For 
this reason, I analyse this case to test whether this is indeed 
true. To determine this value, Equation (2) must be used, 
which means that the ordered quantity will be the same in 
both contracts.  
The supplier’s profit is the total profit and the right-
hand portion of the revenue-sharing rate Equation (6)).  
At this point, we must take into account the connection 
between the quantity discount type and the revenue-
sharing contract. A revenue-sharing contract allows us to 
divide the retailer’s profit among the chain members by the 
predetermined revenue-sharing rate. In case of the 
quantity-discount type, this rate appears only in the 
supplier’s profit, while the retailer does not gain any extra 
profit from the revenue-sharing. 
The profit of the retailer is influenced by the prices 
(Equation (7)). 
The results of the calculation are included in the next 
section. 
RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The results of applying the formulas and the data in the 
previous chapter are shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 
Results of the calculation 
 
𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑶 𝑷𝑷𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴 𝑼𝑼𝑷𝑷 𝑴𝑴𝟏𝟏𝚷𝚷 𝑴𝑴𝟐𝟐𝚷𝚷 ∑𝑴𝑴𝚷𝚷 
 100 pcs EUR EUR 100 EUR  100 EUR 100 EUR 
Take-it-or-
leave-it 20.56 78 65 760.72 0 760.72 
Quantity 
discount 20.56 78 63.2 456.33 304.288 760.62 
Source: own construction 
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The results of the two types are very similar. The 
market price is the same, and because the contracts partly 
use the centralized settings, the ordered quantities are 
equal in both cases. The total profit of the whole chain is 
almost equal – because the quantity discount offers 
somewhat lower prices, the total profit can be slightly 
lower in this case. But there is a very important difference 
between the analysed types: the profit-sharing mechanism. 
As shown by the table, there is no profit for the retailer 
if the supply chain uses the take-it-or-leave-it contract. The 
total profit goes to the supplier. This creates inequality 
between the members, so using this type is recommended 
if the chain has very strong members with very strong 
bargaining power. The Supply Chain Management needs 
the members to implement the supply chain orientation 
which is based on cooperation, loyalty and trust – so the 
goal is to make a win-win situation. The results of take-it-
or-leave-it contract do not show that this type is the right 
choice for a supply chain. Not all kinds of supply chain can 
handle this contract, but the gas industry usually uses this 
type (Polo & Scarpa 2013).  For example take-it-or-leave-
it contracts are used by Central and Eastern European gas 
suppliers MOL and Gazprom (Ostrowski & Butler 2018). 
In this industry there are not very many suppliers but there 
are more customers. This means the customers have just a 
few choices to choose the right partner. In the case of the 
take-it-or-leave-it contract, the suppliers take advantage of 
this situation and that is the reason why this contract needs 
strong suppliers but weaker customers. Customers need 
the required volume of gas, so they are only interested in 
the quantity and not in profit. Suppliers, to maximize their 
profits, determine the unit price; their profit maximizing 
factor is the unit price. The take-it-or-leave-it contract 
allows these conditions. Therefore the take-it-or-leave-it 
contract is a good solution for both parties in the case of 
the gas industry. 
The quantity discount contract shows fairer profit 
values. The supplier realizes higher profit than the retailer 
and this is realistic. However, a centralized setting is less 
typical than a decentralized setting. As a consequence, the 
ordered quantity shifts from the optimal level and this will 
decrease the performance of the chain member and the 
whole supply chain as well.  
To enhance the performance of the supply chains, one 
potential solution can be a quantity flexible contract, which 
can be combined with a quantity discount (Chung et al. 
2014). The simple quantity flexible contract first appeared 
at the end of the 1990s. Then – and unfortunately now as 
well – the proportion of supply chains in the decentralized 
setting was higher than centralized chains. This could be 
the reason why the quantity flexibility contract is often 
used by decentralized supply chains. The recommended 
type is a mix of the quantity discount and the take-it-or-
leave-it contract.  
The higher the quantity the buyer orders, the greater the 
rate of discount that he gets if the quantity discount type is 
used. It is also good for the seller, who can realize better 
profit because of the higher quantity sold and can sell the 
accumulated inventory. But this is a disadvantage for the 
buyer; he overstocks because of the higher ordered 
quantity and it increases the costs and decreases the 
efficiency of his supply chain as well as of the whole 
supply chain. 
One goal of the members, especially the one who is the 
closest to the market and thereby the customers, is to 
always have a sufficient supply to meet fluctuations in 
demand. Using a quantity flexibility contract avoids these 
problems. The contract allows the ordered quantity to be 
changed in real time, so the buyer can refresh his orders 
and can adapt to the demand in a better way. Similar to the 
take-it-or-leave-it type, there are limits for the ordered 
quantity. A maximum and minimum threshold need to be 
determined. Between these values the buyer can change 
the quantity ordered (Tsay 1999). Mainly, the contract 
allows both parties to share the risks and the costs – it 
protects against shortage and overstock (Heydari et al. 
2019). 
The take-it-or-leave-it type of contract is usually used 
by some decentralized supply chains – especially in the gas 
industry – but its applicability has limitations. The quantity 
discount contract is used in both decentralized and 
centralized settings. The optimal case is if the quantity sold 
is equal with the centralized setting; then the coordination 
power is the strongest (Molnár & Faludi 2019). Actually, 
the quantity flexibility contract uses the positive attributes 
of the quantity discount and the take-it-or-leave-it types. 
Further research directions can be to analyse the 
recommended contract types, such as the quantity 
flexibility contract or the revenue-sharing contract, since it 
has some features in common with the quantity discount 
contract.   
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